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Abstract
The way we think, understand, and speak about gender is changing. In 2019, more people
than ever are identifying as nonbinary or gender fluid. Feminism as theory and as political
practice has long assumed the subject of ‘women’ as its primary and essential subject, but the
issues and subjects that feminism speaks for are not necessarily self-identified or even percieved
as ‘women.’ Through analyzing influential feminist works and thinkers, I aim to elucidate the
identitarian comitment of canonical feminsm, and to offer an alternative to the politics of
feminism as always grounded in the subject of ‘women.’ My thesis develops four central
approaches for a feminist politics that is attentive to a plurality of subjects: 1) examining the
connective tissue of emotions and experiences to better grapple with how subjects are
constructed, 2) opening the category of ‘women’ to resignification and new associations, 3)
decentralizing ‘women’ as the primary and sole subject of feminsim, and 4) taking a
post-structural approach to grapple with the constructed and conditional nature of ‘women,’ and
all subjects.

Preface
The debate on what constitutes gender, what constitutes woman, is implicitly important
for feminism, as feminism has historically relied on, and been associated with, the
gendered-subject of women. Theories differ widely across feminist discourse about how to
encapsulate the experiences of women who are oppressed by patriarchal power on a sexual or
gender basis, but what has also ranged and transformed over time is feminism’s definition of
‘women’ as the subject of its politics. Much of feminist theory relies on being able to use the
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word ‘woman’ as the grounding subject connoting an identifiable social location within society,
and within patriarchy. To discuss the injustices that occur systematically against women,
feminism has historically required a definitive description of ‘women,’ in order to indicate who
these injustices occur onto. For feminist politics to fight for the emancipation of subordinated
subjects, must feminism be grounded in a defined and fixed category of identification of women?
If the outlines and definition of the female subject are undecidable, “how can we ground a
feminist politics that deconstructs the female subject?” (Alcoff 1988, p. 419). In “The Identity
Crisis in Feminist Theory,” Linda Alcoff quotes Biddy Martin, arguing that absolving the
category of woman due to an “abstract theoretical correctness… could make the question of
women's oppression obsolete," (Alcoff 1988, p. 419). How can feminist politics understand
gender as deconstructed while still taking up the question of women’s oppression? What would a
feminist politics that isn’t grounded in the subject of ‘women’ look like?
Now more than ever, people are more likely to reject gender binaries, or to identify as
genderqueer. The increasing fluidity of gender identities has been taken up both socially and
legally by means of de-essentializing gender given at birth, and relocating gender as something
performative, unfixed, and grounded in self-identification. The question of how feminism can
proceed without centering the subject of women is particularly relevant in 2019, when ‘women’
as a category is socially expanding to encapsulate more diverse bodies and experiences. The
identity of ‘woman’ is also resisted in some cases, by people who are subject to being socially
categorized as a ‘woman’ due to their embodiment or expression of cultural norms historically
associated with ‘women.’ Political movements around reproductive control, gender
discrimination, and bodily autonomy are movements that can no longer be solely identified as
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“women’s movements” alone, because it is not only women who have a personal stake in these
movements. Gender-fluid people, nonbinary people, trans people, people whose lives are shaped
by sexual subordination, people who are denied bodily autonomy: these are groups who are
excluded from feminism when ‘women’ are assumed to be the primary subject of feminist
movements.
GLAAD’s “Accelerating Acceptance 2017” survey stated that “acceptance of LGBTQ
people has reached historic levels, particularly among Millennials.” The survey found that “12%
of Millennials identify as transgender or gender nonconforming, meaning they do not identify
with the sex they were assigned at birth or their gender expression is different from conventional
expectations of masculinity and femininity,” (Accelerating Acceptance 2017, p. 3). The
revolution of genderqueer-ness is likely due to widespread “increased cultural understanding and
acceptance,” as well as the explosion of internet communities, new technologies, and
post-structural thought. The increasing social validity of identifying as genderqueer is a
cumulative movement, building off of the increasing popularity and access to genderqueer
representation in the media and public sphere. Because of all this progress in moving away from
the gender binary, “young people are now more likely to openly identify as LGBTQ while also
rejecting traditional labels and seeing the world in terms that are beyond a binary,” (Accelerating
Acceptance 2017, p. 7).
We have developed new ways to think and speak about gender, which has been liberatory
in many ways for people who experience gender dysphoria, for people who are transgender, and
for people who do not identify within the man/woman binary of gender. Though this
gender-identity politics has been emancipatory and invaluable, gender fluidity also complicates
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the historical project of feminism, which has relied on a knowable, fixed, and locatable subject of
‘women.’ The concept of ‘woman’ has become a problem for feminist discourse due to
disagreements on how the term can, or should, be applied and defined in varying sociocultural
contexts. With the fluidity of gender making null the fixed boundaries of women’s subjectivity,
there is a threat to how a political movement could even discuss the plight of women, as
deconstruction “threatens to dissipate us and our projects as it… disintegrates the coherence of
women as a collective subject,” (Brown 1995, p. 39). Vital voices have been and are excluded
from feminism due to the rigid fixity of defining women and women’s experiences as the
primary and essential subjects of feminism. How can feminism proceed with a politics capable of
acknowledging the multiplicity of women’s needs, but also how these needs are not specific to
women alone? How can feminist politics still engage in resisting the oppression of women, when
grounding feminist politics in the fixed subject of ‘woman’ produces factionalization,
Eurocentrism, and wound culture, instead of a politics of solidarity? I argue for a feminist
politics of emotion, a feminist politics that both decentralizes and opens the subject of ‘women,’
and a feminist politics of deconstruction. These four approaches are integral for a feminist
politics capabale of taking up gender discrimination in a moment where gender is more fluid
than it has ever been.

Part I
Rethinking Feminism in a Gender Nonconforming Age
The understanding of “women” as the subject of feminism has been a conceptual norm
for many academics and persons for much of the 20th century. To many thinkers, the “defining
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feature of feminist theories has been their grounding in women’s experience,” (Hunter 1996, p.
135). The conceptualization of a “women's experience” has been thought to be “a basis for
feminist politics,” a distinctive sense of women’s liberation being the, or at least the primary,
goal of feminist movements (Hunter 1996, p. 135). It is often assumed that women are the
primary subject of feminism, but that feminism may also include issues of race, sexuality, and/or
class. Thus, “women” are often the assumptive subject of feminist works, unless explicitly stated
otherwise, based for many off the understanding that “women are usually the subject of feminist
history,” (Hunter 1996, p. 135). Grounding feminist analyses around a conceptual framework of
the liberation of ‘women’ fails to account for how women are configured in relation to social
factors beyond the realm of gender.
Exploring how ‘women’ have been understood and articulated as a category that
encapsulates a myriad of persons with shared attributes, helps us understand the historical
connective tissue of feminist theory and politics. Feminism has deployed and relied on the
identity of ‘women’ as the connective tissue that holds together the category of feminist theory.
By “connective tissue,” I mean what compels people to join in solidarity and coalitional
resistance, the externally recognized and acknowledged instrumental qualities generated between
people that stimulate feelings of trust, support, and a cultivated knowledge of tethered
experiences and hopes. Defining who ‘women’ are has been inextricably linked to defining the
politics and aspirations of feminism; feminist politics shift depending on the lived experiences
and cultural effects it is attentive to.
I will explore how feminist discourse has attempted to describe the category of ‘women,’
or to locate the factors that make someone a woman. I explore essentialism in two veins;
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biological essentialism, and experiential essentialism. Essentialism is the understanding that “a
collection of individuals constitutes a kind that is defined by a common and unique property (or
properties),” (Witt 2011, p. 5). Biological essentialism seeks to establish either reproductive or
anatomical properties as what qualifies an individual as a woman. Experiential essentialism
seeks to establish the properties of ‘women’ by the social experiences of women. I will discuss
work by theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who locate the shared
characteristic of all women as occupying subordinated positionalities due to their gendered
and/or sexed bodies. Exploring gender essentialism is crucial to understanding how feminist
politics in our current moment are inhibited by relying and insisting on a fixed subject (women)
in order to ground feminist politics.
I will discuss the views of ‘cultural feminism,’ a term borrowed from Linda Alcoff,
which says women have a shared ‘essence,’ which is grounded in either reproductive capacities
or social behaviors. This is a mode of experiential essentialism, but it has ties to biological
essentialism in that this ‘essence’ is rooted in having a female body. I explore cultural feminism
in order to locate the professed ‘essence’ of women, where cultural feminism fails to
acknowledge the constructed character of feminized subjects, and also where cultural feminism
actually reinforces the concept of a natural, inherent gender identity, which serves to position
women in accordance to the ideals of who ‘women’ are, or should be, notions of ‘women’ that
are enforced and maintained by patriarchal structures of dominance. Though cultural feminism
asserts a type of reclamation politics by hoping to destigmatize values that have been historically
been associated with women, (i.e. caregiving, emotional intelligence, nurturing), this method of
experiential essentialism fails to imagine a conception of ‘woman,’ nor a subject of feminism,
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that is not solely produced and defined by the effects of patriarchal power, which regulates,
categorizes, and associates ‘women’ with specific virtues in order to claim an inevitable and
natural division of social and political power due to gender difference.
Some have argued that feminist politics cannot survive without a claim to an interpretable
subject, like theorist Linda Alcoff who argues that “the concept of woman is a problem” for
feminists and feminist ideology alike, because “the concept and category of woman is the
necessary point of departure for any feminist theory and feminist politics,” yet the question of
what defines women has either been assumed, or set aside (Alcoff 1988, p. 405). I argue that the
category of ‘women’ is not the necessary point of departure for feminist politics or feminist
theory, but rather that the category of ‘women’ should be taken up by feminist theorists as a
contestable, shifting, and always re-situated identity. I also argue that using the identity category
of ‘women’ to ground a politics is less useful than a politics grounded in solidarity, a politics of
resistance, of both sharing and witnessing, of relation between and among identities.
What could feminism become if we allowed “the concept of woman” to be a rich arena
for understanding how gender functions, instead of the problem that Linda Alcoff suggests it is?
I argue it is important for feminist theory to retain the grasp on the role of identity in analyses of
the present, but I also assert that the deconstruction of ‘women’ offered by post-structuralist
feminst theory is not necessarily an attempt to ‘do away’ with analyzing the tangible and
emotional affects of identification. I will move to discuss the work of post-structural feminist
theories from Judith Butler and Denise Riley in order to examine the constructive nature and
performativity of gender, creating a deeper understanding the temporality, location, and
embodiment of being a woman that is de-essentialized from both the body, and from any notion
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of an internal or naturalized gender ‘essence.’ Grappling with the deconstructed subject of
‘woman’ has positive consequences for feminism, of understanding and unpacking the role of
social and political institutions in determining our identities.
Beyond deconstructing the identity of ‘woman,’ feminism would benefit from
distinguishing itself from a politics of identity. Identity politics are insufficient as a political
praxis, because this politics fails to recognize that the sameness or overlap of identities does not
beget a shared commitment to a political movement or ideology. Feminism is suffering an
identity crisis, but this crisis will birth new ways of being in the world, new commonalities, new
communities, new ways of connection that are built around viewpoints, political desires, and the
connective tissues of experience and emotion.
My Approach
I will analyze influential feminist theories that have attempted to resolve the debate on
who ‘women’ are, and thus position a feminist politics that is grounded in either the biological
essentialism of women, or the experiential essentialism of women. It is important to think about
how feminists have thought about these debates around ‘identity’ in order to understand our
contemporary moment. The question of ‘women’ has been taken up before, and it is important to
understand how feminist politics have been situated in accordance to these definitions, because
feminist politics is currently situated due to work of these canonical feminists, among others.
Identities are important to people: they are meaningful. While this meaning is applied, as
opposed to inherent, identities have a profound impact on people’s lived experiences, how we
make sense of our place in the world, and how we relate to each other. Though identity is
prescriptive, constructed, and culturally contingent, identity also is a meaningful tool to
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understand how we are produced as subjects, a production that is constant, never complete, and
always embedded in how we make sense of ourselves. Feminism should retain the investment of
grappling with how identities are produced, and how they produce us. To investigate how a
feminist politics can take up gender fluidity is imperative to feminism’s emancipatory potential,
and is an essential task for feminism’s affective political impact.
I hope to elucidate the relentless identitarian commitment of feminist theory of the past,
because I hope to profess a feminism that is not restricted to ‘women’ as its subject. The task of
defining ‘women’ cannot and should not be closed. Feminism cannot proceed as a politics of
identity, nor a politics grounded in the subject of ‘woman.’ This ground is unstable, this ground
is a shape-shifter, this ground is invested in its own subordination, this ground is not universal,
this ground cannot speak, alone, for a politics of resistance. Feminism musn’t necessitate
boundaries between sexed and gendered categories in order to be a political movement that
organizes in resistance against the subordination of feminized subjects, of vulnerable subjects, of
subordinated subjects.
In this thesis, I will be unpacking four central approaches for contemporary feminism in a
society of increasing gender fluidity: a renewed understanding of connective tissues and how the
politics of emotion construct our experiences and identities; opening the subject of ‘women’ to
resignification and qualities; decentralizing the subject of ‘women’ within feminist politics to
focus instead on contingent feminisms with a plurality of subjects; an investment in feminist
consciousness; and a turn to movements over identity to ground feminist politics.
Connective Tissues of Emotion and Experience
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I hope to understand how feminist politics can operate from a more multivariable
conception of womanness. I hope to prove that there are connective tissues among women that
can serve as a platform for feminism, tissues that avoid exclusionary requirements of biology or
innate essence. These connective tissues that produce group consciousness can be located by
looking at Sara Ahmed’s work of feminist constructive nature through how emotions move
through, and form, the subject of ‘women.’ In The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed explores
how emotions circulate in the form of economies, sticking and becoming signifiers of specific
subjects, as well as bonding and providing a basis for solidarity on commonly shared grounds.
How women are read as ‘emotional’ in some contexts provides an interesting basis for discussing
the role that emotions play in how we make sense of our own identities, and the identities of
others. Ahmed’s work professes a category of women to be emotionally constructed, both in how
people self-identify as women, and in how one perceives or locates an ‘other’ as a woman.
Opening the Category of ‘Women’ to Resignification
I argue for a feminist politics that works to destabilize the category of ‘women’ by
opening that identity up to resignification, varied associations, and a plurality of bodies.
Allowing the category of ‘women’ to be up for debate, always, serves to open up feminism to a
plurality of subordinated subjects. Feminism should allow the term of ‘women’ to remain open,
to never be fixed in relation to a subordinated status, nor an anatomical makeup.
Decentralizing the Subject: A Focus and Endorsement of Contingent Feminisms
If any assumed universal traits of women are racist, classist, and heteronormative, is there
a salvageable category of ‘women’ to carry with us into future theorizing if we are also fighting
for to strip feminism of its white supremacy, heteronormativity, and disregard for how women’s
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experiences vary across socioeconomic position and cultural location? It seems that “in many
contexts, 'women' are too heterogeneous to be treated as a unitary group,” (Hunter 1996, 156).
The task of mitigating our discourse to avoid totalizing any theory is a positive trajectory for
intersectional feminism. Perhaps there should be no ‘feminism,’ only feminisms, a network of
alliances to alleviate subordination that occurs through various apparatuses on our gendered and
sexed beings. Resistance to patriarchal oppression will be best enacted when actual connective
tissues of subordinated femininity are elucidated, and subjected to constant re-phrasing and
conceptualizing.
Feminist Consciousness: A Turn to Movements Over Identity
I argue that the discussions on deconstructing the subject of ‘women’ are important for
feminism, but I also intervene to describe a plurality of connectivities among and around women
that offer a feminist group-consciousness with which to connect, weave, and ground a feminist
politics on the basis of a deeper understanding of how subordinated subjects are constructed and
exist in the world. Feminism needs tethering, not grounding, to be focused not through a fixed
subject, but to be focused on collectives of emotion, material ties, and the deconstruction of
historical prefigurements of identity. The language of ‘grounding’ insinuates a stabilization, or a
fixed point of tangible reference. Feminism should adopt a practice that is not grounded, but
tethered, as tethered requires multiple points of reference at differing locations. In order to open
the subject of feminism, I want to review how the subject has been closed in canonical feminist
theory, by rigid and exclusionary definitions of ‘women’ as the natural subject of feminism.

Part II
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Literature Review: Gender Essentialisms
The reason that I am addressing essentialism is to understand how women have
problematically been defined in a way that limits political possibilities for women, and limits the
possibilities for feminist politics. I will be looking at biological gender essentialism and
experiential gender essentialism to understand how feminist theory has attempted to construct
women, and what kind of feminist politics arise from these constructions.
Biological essentialism
Biological essentialism is the oldest school of thought in understanding gender, and is
thus the most instantiated, ingrained, and widely spread theory of how gender works. Biological
essentialism is the theory that our biology (the physical body) is a reliable determinator or
explanation for how people are socially identified and understood; it is the theory that individuals
have a baseline of physical construction that results in how they behave, are treated, and where
they are located within society. Biological gender essentialism argues that behavioral and social
differences, gender roles, and differing social locations between genders are all caused by the
inherent, material, and pre-political characteristics of their bodies. Biological gender essentialism
also promotes a cisgender universalism of “women”; it is the theory that one’s biology dictates
one’s gender, with a correspondence of male sex organs to “man,” and female sex organs to
“woman.”
The social condition of being a woman thus originates with having female anatomy, and
women are oppressed in social, political, and personal sphere through t heir bodies; subordination
of women is enacted through regulation and control of women’s sexual, maternal, and female
body.
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One of the most essential feminist texts that relies on biological essentialism is Adrienne
Rich’s “Of Woman Born.” For Rich, the role of “the mother” is a connective tissue among all
women, thus grounding her feminist politics in a material and biological conception of ‘women.’
Rich relies on an implicitly-cisgendered woman as a subject, which enables her to show how
women with female anatomy across cultures interact differently to the two meanings of
motherhood she defines: first, “potential relationship of any woman to her powers of
reproduction” and second, the institution “which aims at ensuring that that potential - and all
women - shall remain under male control,” (Rich 1997, p. 13). Thus, biological potential to
reproduce as a mother is a tool utilized and controlled by patriarchal supremacy, configuring
women’s oppression by men, at least in part, as due to bodily and reproductive possibility.
Sprung from essentialism have come universal claims of joint, reproductive sufferings
due to woman’s “female” anatomy, a female anatomy that shapes and dictates the lives of
women, as “the female generative organs… have become a prime target of patriarchal
technology,” (Rich 1997, p. 127). Biological reproduction is configured by Rich as the material
means with which women are controlled, through systemic and societal investments in the
institution of motherhood. Rich argues that the womb has historically been “made into a source
of powerlessness” for the purposes of “transfiguring and enslaving woman,” (Rich 1997, p. 68).
The material presence of the womb is what subjects a woman to powerlessness as a
woman. Rich points to de Beauvoir’s argument that “It was as Mother that woman was fearsome;
it is in maternity that she must be transfigured and enslaved,” (de Beauvoir 1952, p. 171). Both
authors localize women’s subordination in how social, political, and medical institutions seek to
exclude, transfigure, and enslave women by proxy of their reproductive and biological
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capacities. R
 ich says that if “rape has been terrorism, then motherhood has been penal
servitude,” (Rich 1997, p. 14). This analogy describes how the female body is the site, symbol,
and receptacle of women’s oppression. As women are oppressed, they are oppressed through
their lack of sovereignty over their own reproduction, which also denies women sovereignty of
their bodies and lives.
This biological gender essentialism offers a navigable feminist politics for the
emancipation of women. By defining women within their biological makeup, feminist politics
thus are oriented towards a politics of investment in women’s bodily sovereignty, mobility, and
access to public and political spaces, and such a politics is reactive to barriers that restrict
women’s bodies. The institution of motherhood hardly offers an entirely comprehensive site for
women’s subordination, but it is one of the threads that traverses the cluster of gender: Some
women are oppressed in response to their reproductive capacities, but other women are
oppressed because of their deviations from the norms of motherhood, or for having male sex
organs while identifying as female.
Creating a politics around anatomy further subjects women to being associated with and
delimited to their anatomy. It is important to de-hierarchize reproductive rights within feminist
politics, because reproductive rights are not a coherent or universal signifier of women’s
struggle, nor of the feminist struggle. Patriarchal power operates not just on women’s delegation
to the role of mother, but also to the role of wife, daughter, sex object, woman in the workforce,
etc. The overemphasis on the role that motherhood plays in women’s oppression severely
underestimates the reach of patriarchal power, which extends to control and oppress women
further beyond their reproductive capacity. Just as feminist political thinkers like Rich are
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resisting biological essentialism in arguing that gender subordination is not a natural or inherent
consequence of gender difference, they also rely on the premise that gender difference is
essential, inherent and fixed due to biological difference. A conception of women as tied to their
biology, and therefore their reproductive capacity, falters as a functional ground for feminist
politics because this conception refuses to articulate women outside of their anatomical
existence. Not all women have uteri, not all women are able to reproduce, and a portion of the
people who possess the ability to give birth are not women. Simply, not all women experience
reproductive subordination, and many people who do are not women. Assuming that women are
oppressed because of their association with motherhood is an incomplete picture of how women
are subordinated by the multifacets of patriarchal power, and this analysis overemphasizes
reproduction both in the lives of women, and as a determining factor of womanhood. A majority
of women in the world have reproductive potential and are thus controlled and subordinated
through patriarchal control of this capacity, which I argue can be maintained as a, b ut not the
connective tissue between women and Mothers, because though these identities are at times
concurrently embodied, neither category necessitates the other. Resistance to the harmful
institutionalization of motherhood, and how mothers are oppressed and subordinated is an
important project for feminism, but it is surely not the grounds for feminism. Contesting and
promoting women’s authority and domain as mothers is an important strand of feminist praxis,
but this tissue is connective among a plurality of bodies, and it is not connective for all women.
In “A Note on Anger,” Marilyn Frye importantly notes that the extension of women’s
ability to advocate justice, anger, and autonomy within the role of the mother “represents only a
small shift in the concept of Woman. Historically and logically it was an extension of our right to
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mother,” (Frye 1983, p. 92). To interrogate the right of the mother would be to assault one of the
few roles in which women are given and denied sovereignty in patriarchal society, but it is not
within these bounds exclusively that feminist politics should advocate for sovereignty of women.
Articulating women’s rights as mothers rights re-instantiates women’s inevitable and assigned
role as a caretaker, nurturer, and conserver. A reproductive feminist politics limits feminist
politics that do not speak from the socially-accepted position of ‘woman as mother.’ Biological
gender essentialism is a limited and contradictory model for identifying the subject of feminism,
because centralizing the discussion of ‘women’s rights as mothers’ is limited to pre-accepted and
pre-stratified norms of how women should be, and who women are.

Experiential Essentialism
Experiential gender essentialism defines women not in their biology, but in their social
experience of subordination under patriarchy, where women’s subjectivity is configured by men
and patriarchal power. I turn to Catharine MacKinnon in order to explain experiential
essentialism, where MacKinnon “locates women's essence in the social realm. For her, the
defining fact about women is that they are socially subordinated, primarily through the
appropriation of their sexuality.” (Hunter 1996, p. 137). In the system of patriarchy, ‘women’ are
wholly constructed by their “collective social history of disempowerment, exploitation and
subordination extending to the present,” (MacKinnon 1991, p. 15). MacKinnon emphasizes the
distinct social experience of women as a ground for the group consciousness of women. For
MacKinnon, being treated as a woman is “to refer to this diverse and pervasive concrete material
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reality of social meanings and practices,” and “to be disadvantaged in these ways incident to
being socially assigned to the female sex,” (MacKinnon 1991, p. 15-16).
MacKinnon’s notion of a “social experience” that aligns individuals into the category of
women relies on a notion of socially distinguishable gender cues, of first being able to interpret
someone as a woman in order to treat them as a woman. MacKinnon’s theory also works to draw
large patterns of globalized patriarchal domination, which exists and acts upon women to
different degrees depending on their positionality within social strata. Describing the treatment
of women is “to describe the realities of women's situation,” which though cannot be
universalized as ‘the same’ for all women, women’s situation as subordinate parallels across
social dimensions of race and class to describe oppressions of sexual degradation, sexual
harassment, the demeaning of feminized labor, unequal compensation as male counterparts
within mirroring racial and economic strata, as well as dehumanization (MacKinnon 1991, p.
15).
Andrea Dworkin is another canonical and influential feminist thinker who utilizes
experiential gender essentialism. In the book Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography,
and Equality, as well as in much of her other work, Dworkin too describes women as defined by
their subordination, but she locates this subordination in the gendered violence of pornography:
It (Pornography) sexualizes inequality and in doing so creates discrimination as a
sex-based practice.
It permeates the political condition of women in society by being the substance of our
inequality however located-in jobs, in education, in marriage, in life.
It is women, kept a sexual underclass, kept available for rape and battery and incest and
prostitution.
It is what we are under male domination; it is what we are for under male domination.
It is the heretofore hidden (from us) system of subordination that women have been told
is just life.
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Under male supremacy, it is the synonym for what being a woman is, (Dworkin 1985, p.
10).

Dworkin understands pornography as a site, culmination, and manifestation of women’s
subjectivity, implicitly built into the power structures and dynamics of the industry of
pornography. Dworkin’s analysis of pornography is limited to pornography that has an assumed
male viewer of the female body or of the sexual act, an assumed heterosexual-male perspective
of power dynamics, and an assumed replication of the gender discrimination that is rampant in
contemporary (and past) society. Dworkin also conceptualizes the creation of the subject of
women as being formed through denigration and subordination, as “the creation of a sexual
dynamic in which the putting-down of women, the suppression of women, and ultimately the
brutalization of women, is what sex is taken to be,” (Dworkin 1985, p. 9). If pornography is an
institution that creates women through dynamics of subordination, then the application of the
subject “woman” does not necessarily need to apply only to female bodies.
What useful material I gather from Dworkin and MacKinnon’s arguments are the
villainization of the feminine, the collapsing of categories of the weak and overpowered with the
category of women. Pornography is a reflection of naturalized gender dynamics, where women
are configured as those who are dominated, exposed, and exploited. What would Dworkin’s
analysis of pornography offer the photos of sexual and physical abuse committed by U.S.
soldiers at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison? The sexualization of inequality and of power dynamics is
not limited to female bodies or women subjects, but permeates across the bodies of prisoners,
queer people, and non-white persons who live in white-dominated societies. Sexual
subordination and the manipulation of bodies by dominant groups is in no way specific to the
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identities of man and woman, but works rather as a script that can slide from context to context,
where power differences lie. The prisoners at Abu Ghraib were abused, raped, and dehumanized,
and many of these acts were documented and distributed. If pornography is an institution that
causes the affects of pleasure at the witnessing of subordination, it is in no way “a synonym for
what a woman is,” as Dworkin professes it is. Sexual subordination and abuse manifest in
locations of pre-existing power dynamics, between prison guards and prisoners, priests and
parish boys, men and women… To divorce sexual subordination from the condition of b eing a
woman would serve feminist theory to navigate a more comprehensive and inclusive analysis of
how sexual subordination is weaponized and deployed in pre-existing power dynamics.
In response to the assertions of women as connected due to mutual subordination from
masculine forces, what else are women? How are women shaped by emotions, by material
objects, by their community and social positioning? Deploying subordination as the definitive
marker of ‘women’ is a troubling base for feminist politics. If we reject this ontological base for
women, we then also concede that subordination alone is not what then defines ‘women.’
Unified only through their designation to a subordinated group, ‘women’ would not exist if they
didn’t occupy these subordinate positions, so configuring identity this way limits women’s
capacity to avoid subordination while still remaining a woman.

The Problem with Defining Women in Terms of Subordination
Experiential essentialism must also reconcile the political implications of designating
“subordinate positioning” as the ontological base of women, which serves to ideologically
position and reposition women as subordinate. For thinkers like Jacques Derrida, identifying
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within the binary structure of gender (as a woman) does not subvert the “dichotomous hierarchy”
essential to the division of genders (Alcoff 1988, p. 417). This argument is also clear in Alcoff’s
synopsis of post-structuralist thinkers like Foucault, who rejects the investments in identity by
“oppositional subjects,” because such investments “merely recreate and sustain the discourse of
power,” that constructed the identities as oppositional in the first place (Alcoff 1988, p. 418).
One of the most compelling interventions in feminist politics grounded in the subject of
‘women’ is Wendy Brown’s essay “Wounded Attachments.” For Brown, the act of claiming
marginalized and/or oppressed identities is problematically tethered to the structures of
domination that seek to maintain the subordination of women and/or marginalized identities.
This argument disrupts the premise of the experiential essentialism, specifically the essentialism
utilized by thinkers like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, who choose to deploy a
feminist politics grounded in women’s identity as subordinated subjects. Women’s “wounded
attachment” to the identity of ‘women’ is hypothesized by Brown as an investment in the
continued subordination of women. Making a claim to an oppressed identity re-substantiates the
subject as oppressed. In Brown’s argument, a subject making an identity-based political claim is
susceptible to further subjugating themselves by claiming status and recognition in “categories
such as race or gender that emerged and circulated as terms of power to enact subordination,”
(Brown 1995, p. 55). I push Brown’s argument to further specificity, that it is the conflation of
the injury and the identity that does the work of making this attachment wounded, rather than
simply the identification within subordinated categories. Political action grounded in one’s claim
to an injured identity maintains an investment in the very conditions that made the injury
possible. This produces results that contradict the feminisms emancipatory intentions. This
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paradox requires that women find liberation not through claiming injury as identity, but rather
through articulating a desired future based off of what is denied or absent form the present.
Brown asks “what kind of political recognition can identity-based claims seek... that will not
resubordinate a subject itself historically subjugated through identity, through categories such as
race or gender that emerged and circulated as terms of power to enact subordination?” (Brown
1995, p. 55). Brown makes this argument among a chorus of other theorists considered to be
postmodern and/or poststructuralist feminists; Julia Kristeva, Denise Riley, Judith Butler,
Jacques Derrida… the list goes on. These theorists argue that claims to a subjectivity of ‘woman’
actually further the very subordination and denigration that feminist politics hopes to alleviate.
While I agree that articulating oneself as subordinated has different effects than articulating a
desired future for politics, I also acknowledge the limitations of Brown’s theory of “Wounded
Attachments,” limitations that inadequately recognize the difference b etween a feminist politics
that conflates injury and identity, and a feminist politics of recognizing injuries that occur onto
persons because of how they are located within the sociocultural matrix of identity. If feminist
politic wants to be attentive to the experiences of oppressed peoples, experiences of injury will
remain as an integral aspect of collective healing and grievances, and motivating a politics of
resistance. Speaking about injury is a contestation of the conditions of the world, and feminist
politics can take up the politics of injury by understanding that these experiences of injury are
not specific or limited to women, and therefor injury and sexual subordination are not the
defining factors of being a woman, even if many women experience them.

Cultural Feminism
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Subordination and biology are not the only ways feminist thinkers have attempted to
define ‘women.’ I borrow the term “cultural feminism” from Linda Alcoff’s work “Cultural
Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory.” Cultural feminism
is another mode of gender essentialism, which defines ‘woman’ by reclaiming (from men)
women’s right to define themselves. Within cultural feminism, there has been an effort to define
‘feminine’ virtues as correctly attributed to women, but wrongfully denigrated to be useless or
weak virtues. Alcoff discusses cultural feminists such as Adrienne Rich, who rejects biological
reductionism, yet insists on a “female consciousness” which she grounds in biological factors
like body parts and menstruation. Thus, women are not reduced to their physical and bodily level
as totalizing explanation of who women are, which would be a reductionist claim. The female
essences described by Rich are both experiential and biological, but the experiential cannot exist
without the biological in these theoretical frameworks. The female consciousness relies on an
understanding of women’s body as cisgender, reproductive, and able-bodied.
Promoting a conception of an innate female essence serves to preserve how women have
been formed due to conditions of patriarchal domination, thus preserving the effects of
domination, and deeming these effects “innate” to women. To the extent a concrete feminine
essence “reinforces essentialist explanations” of the attributes of nurturing, peacefulness, and
caregiving to women, these theories are “in danger of solidifying an important bulwark for sexist
oppression: the belief in an innate ‘womanhood’ to which we must all adhere lest we be deemed
either inferior or not ‘true’ women,” (Alcoff 1988, p. 414). This discourse is trans-exclusionary,
impractically universalized, and deeply steeped in reproductive essentialism. Alcoff summarizes
cultural feminisms as being grounded in, and creating, an “essentialist response to misogyny and
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sexism through adopting a homogeneous, unproblematized, and ahistorical conception of
woman,” (Alcoff 1988, p. 413.) We must also grapple with the oppressive conditions that
produce seemingly ‘innate’ traits among some women, conditions such as “forced parenting, lack
of physical autonomy, dependency for survival on mediation,” (Alcoff 1988, p. 414). Claiming
traits of nurturing and caregiving as innate to women further justifies the gendered division of
labor that categorizes women as naturally dispositioned for childcare, emotional labor, and
peace-keeping. Cultural feminist politics attempt to destigmatize historically associated feminine
characteristics, but they advocate for the reclamation of these characteristics by claiming them
essential to women’s nature, rather than grappling with how these behaviors are illicited,
enforced, and assumed in women. This descriptive account of the essence of ‘woman’ is an
incoherent and inaccurate ground for feminist consciousness to build off.
Instead of deploying a descriptive account of women’s subjectivity, I argue for a feminist
politics that deploys a deconstructive account of women’s subjectivity. Alcoff’s intervention of
cultural feminism is that this theory problematically essentializes the effects of patriarchy as
inherent to women. In studying how patriarchy affects feminized bodies, both cultural and
experiential essentialism have problematically limited their subjects to the category of ‘women.’
I protest against a feminist politics of identity, insofar as ‘identity’ is assumed to be the
connective tissue of the feminist movement. I hope to employ a deconstructive method that
de-essentializes the effects of patriarchy from the subject of ‘women,’ but still maintains an
analysis for how these effects become integrated into sociocultural schemas of gender difference.

The Deconstructive Approach of Post-structural Feminism
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The post-structural intervention in feminist theory is to define women as entirely socially
constructed, that there are no inherent or essential traits of gender. ‘Woman’ is produced as a
sexed object, a cultural construct, and as a set of ideals to be performed. One of the most
prominent thinkers in post-structural feminism is Judith Butler, who in Gender Trouble d escribes
that discursive terrain that constructs the category of “woman.” Butler points to the discursive
structure of gender as a force that “produces reality-effects that are eventually misperceived as
'facts'" (Butler 1992, p. 115). Butler uses de Beauvoir’s claim that “one is not born, but rather
becomes a woman” to suggest that “woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing
that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end,” (Butler 1992, p. 45). For Butler, gender has no
telos of embodiment, but is established and performed through “regulatory practices” that
produce binary categories of sex and gender (Butler 1992, p. 44).
For Butler, ‘gender’ has no essential characteristics, nor does the word ‘woman,’
accurately encapsulate any one group of individuals. To the degree that gender is ‘real,’ this
conception of ‘realness’ is sustained on maintaining a ‘knowable’ world, a ‘nameable’ world, a
taxonomic organization of individuals based on shared characteristics, capabilities, and behavior.
Natalie Stoljar’s analysis of transgender character Venus Xtravaganza in Paris is Burning r eveals
how subjects like Xtravaganza exemplify “people of indeterminate biological sex to whom the
common-sense concept of woman clearly applies due to their behaviors, clothes, make- up,
sexuality, hair, body shape, etc,“ (Stoljar 1995, p. 273). This argument denaturalizes sex from
gender and de-essentializes the category of ‘women’ as ‘people with female bodies.’ Thus, the
oppression of feminized subjects does not circulate in a way that touches only female bodies, but
also bodies that represent and replicate a concept of ‘womanness,’ of pertaining to and
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identifying with women as an idealized concept, thus denoting participation and existence within
the social-class of ‘women.’
The irresolute and fluctuating embodiment of an idealized, normative ‘realness’ is the
grid by which individuals assess their own (and others’) existence, or ‘realness.’ ‘Realness’
comes with a burden of proof, of performing and embodying an identity that may or may not
maximize one’s ability to survive and/or thrive in a world where power (access and/or control of
resources) is often distributed among racial, gender and class-based groups. Realness does not
solely appear on the surface of our bodies, nor the configurement of our bodies; ‘realness’ is
created in the perceptions that others have of us, and the relativity of our identity to others in
approximate locations.
This argument is anti-essentialist in its acknowledgement of the malleability and
temporality of gender; at times, and in certain spaces, the body becomes aware of its gendered
dimensions. The awareness of one’s gender and the sociocultural consequences that come with it
need not be restricted to such temporality; the effects of gender oppression on the individual are
not contingent upon being either “in and out of the eye of ‘the social,’” (Riley 2003, p. 103). A
body resisting the ultimate definitive state of “woman” is not a condition for avoiding being
treated or perceived as a woman in a totalizing manner. The social categorization of gender is
temporal and transitory, but the subjection and ‘other’-ing of some bodies and not others can be
analyzed through historical patterns of queer, female, and gender non-conforming peoples
inhabiting bodies that are perceived as feminine, and thus are sites for patriarchal subordination.
Denise Riley argues that the body is not “an originating point nor yet a terminus; it is a
result or an effect,” (Riley 2003, p. 102). Like Butler, gender has no telos for Riley. Temporality
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is the most important notion that arises from Riley’s chapter “Bodies, Identities, Feminisms,” a
temporality of the sexed and gendered body. She opens the method “of tracing the (always
anatomically gendered) body as it is differently established and interpreted as sexed within
different periods,” (Riley 2003, p. 103). The body only sometimes poses its question in terms of
gender, and gendered divisions do not in sum define one’s bodily life. Are there some places
gender cannot go? Even liberated from the binary, on a spectrum of gender identifications, does
gender always occur if it is so constructed? Are there moments of genderless existence, and what
are the circumstances? To view the female body as perennially defined, as “constant and even
embodiments of sexed being,” is to oversimplify the individual’s capacity to move in and out of
the social and individual experience of gender. Clearly gender occurs onto us differently in the
presence of others, and it occurs onto us in different ways around different persons. To be made
aware of one’s gender, to be talked to, looked at, or treated as a woman, this register of
awareness is always approaching, receding, and slipping in and out of sight from the individual’s
eye, just as gender moves in and out of the social eye. Being a ‘woman’ is formed externally
within the social or cultural landscapes that one may enter, and pressed onto the bodies of
‘women’ who are categorized as such. In reference to my discussion of “passing” as a woman,
this is the ability to “pass” as an idealized construct of a woman. Passing tends to reward women
who embody femininity most closely to the idealized requirements of docility, utility, and
beauty, but these embodiments are temporally located in both their expression of femininity, and
their recognition as femininity, both of which fluctuate temporally, and locationally. The internal
experience of being a gender is hardly internal, but is instead a marker of how individuals are
interpreted by themselves and by others, both socially and politically.
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While Riley and Butler both emphasize non-essentialist arguments for what “woman” is,
neither seems to offer what irreplaceable benefits exist from the identity category of “woman;”
Specifically, neither seriously acknowledge that there is an absolute reason to retain a group
consciousness of ‘women.’ Many thinkers have argued (such as Linda Alcoff and Susan Bordo)
that the category of “woman” does have unwavering benefits, and theories that seek to dispose of
the category often offer few concrete suggestions for non-essentialist feminist politics outside the
academy. For my argument, I acknowledge that ‘woman’ has played an important role in
building consciousness to resist oppression, but that group-consciousness based solely on a claim
to identity, or a designation to identity, does not give ‘grounding’ to the political movement of
feminism. This appeared ‘grounding’ is linguistic, and professes that the sameness of identity
characteristics connotes a sameness of politics or strife, a grounding that limits feminism from
exploring structures of domination outside of patriarchy, and subjects outside of women.

Part III
Connective Tissues of Emotion, Women, and Feminism
What if feminist politics could be grounded in the connective tissue of emotions that
shape the lives of oppressed peoples, instead of grounded in the assumed, homogeonous subject
of ‘women’? Emotions of pain have historically been vital to describing women’s experiences, as
“women’s experiences of violence, injury and discrimination have been crucial to feminist
politics,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 172). A painful emotion, such as shame, is not a material
consequence of gender, but can be read as an emotion often signifying an individual's relative
closeness to physically embodying normative ideals of their “gender.” Tamara Ferguson and
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Heidi Lee Dempsey discuss the role that gender plays in an individual's likelihood to feel shame
and guilt in social contexts, with findings that suggest one of the conditions of being a ‘woman’
is feeling shame, a deeply physical and psychological affect (Ferguson & Dempsey, 2000).
Could a base that unites women in a joint revolution also be a base that is shared by individuals
who are not women? Rephrased, widespread experience and commonality may be shared
between groups without losing their revolutionary potency in advocating for alleviation of how
social pressure affects a certain community of individuals.
Moving from shame to fear in understanding connective tissues of feminism offers
another vantage point for feminist politics. Sara Ahmed discusses how “feelings of fear and
vulnerability hence shape women’s bodies” by authorized narratives of “who should be afraid is
bound up with the politics of mobility, whereby the mobility of some bodies involves or even
requires the restriction of the mobility of others,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 70). Taking Stoljar’s second
point from her cluster concept of woman, varying qualifications and characteristics of ‘women’
gather in a cluster, touching the bodies of women, and touching the bodies of feminized,
subordinated, and/or sexualized bodies. Social factors like fear are also seen as a connective
tissue of women’s experience, in that fear of being in the pubic world means one is susceptible to
“shrinkage,” away from spaces marked as ‘unsafe’ for women, like being out at night, walking
alone, and being in places like bars and nightclubs where drugging and sexual violence have
become normalized to such an extent that the onus is put on women to prevent their own
experience of violence by simply removing themselves, or avoiding ‘reckless’ behavior (like
wearing something revealing, or drinking). If fear sticks to some bodies because of social
narratives of who should be scared, we can apply this emotional process to our study of the
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proxemics of public space; to analyze how public space organized and maintained as a place
where certain people should be scared for their life or well-being. Fear sticks to bodies that suffer
systemic violence; black men are murdered by police in public space, trans people are attacked
or murdered in public space, houseless people are so dehumanized that violence onto them in a
public space is seen as consequential of their existence. A feminist politics could address and
bring attention to how fear circulates, and who it sticks to. Some bodies are marked as objects of
fear, where existing in public space is dangerous because they are perceived as a threat.
Moving from fear to vulnerability, some bodies and representations are seen and treated
as more vulnerable to violence than others. Sara Ahmed says that “vulnerability is not an
inherent characteristic of women’s bodies; rather, it is an effect that works to secure femininity
as a delimitation of movement in the public, and over-inhabitance in the private,” (Ahmed 2015,
p. 70). The emotion of feeling vulnerable has to do with a certain expectation of violence. Seeing
others as vulnerable does the work of underestimating their capacity to defend themselves, and
also as seeing them as obvious receptacles for violence. In attaching to subjects such as women
and children, the emotion of vulnerability does the work of justifying necessary external
protection, which allows external forces (the State, men, parents) to deny rights based on
assuming control of the vulnerable subject’s protection. A feminist politics that analyzes how
some bodies get marked as vulnerable, despite the realistic probability that violence won’t occur,
and how some bodies get marked as objects of fear, despite the realist probability that violence is
likely to occur onto them, this politics could better attend to the emotions that hold so many of
our political ideals, prejudices, and stereotypes in place, despite evidence to the contrary.
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Experiences of shame, hyper-sexualization, sexual subordination, abuse, and silencing
could be seen as the affects of women, (not women alone, but of women nonetheless.) The
argument that these emotions and affects circulate and stick to some bodies, and not others,
would provide a comprehensive reading of how identities are constructed and played into on a
deeply emotional level. Conceiving of the subjectivity of women could involve a deep analysis
of the "complex of habits resulting from the semiotic interaction of 'outer world' and 'inner
world,' the continuous engagement of a self or subject in social reality,” (de Lauretis 1995, p.
182). This interaction between the subject and social reality is semiotic, as de Lauretis points out,
involving charged signs and symbols of identification which both produce the subject, and
produce social reality. To investigate the cluster concept of ‘women’ would also involve
interrogating how signs, objects, and symbols come to be gendered, and come to signify gender.
The web of woman is not made up of obstacles and hindrances alone. The joy of
solidarity of people who have suffered not as you have suffered, but who have suffered
nonetheless; not someones who feels your pain, but bears witness and comradery to your pain. In
The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Sara Ahmed discusses the impossibility of an empathy that
would profess ‘I feel your pain!’ The very impossibility of this empathy, how some pains are
impossible to grasp but it is because of this impossibility that we must subject ourselves to “a
different kind of inhabitance,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 39). Ahmed professes an “ethics of responding
to pain,” of “being open to being affected by that which one cannot know or feel,” (Ahmed 2015,
p. 32). To recognize and discover that which “refuses to keep us apart, but also does not bring us
together,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 39). A collective politics must find an ethics of responding to pain,
or this professed solidarity will be empty. There is also the joy, that comes from a chorus of

30

Gwen Frost

desires for a different world, the community and comradery that comes from all the darkness of
oppression. For women who give birth to their first child, for men who give birth to their first
child, the joys of carrying a child, the joys of raising a child, the joys of never, ever having a
child, all the joys of womanhood, of personhood. The joys of what has been considered ‘woman’
seep out from the depalidated borders of the category of women, to touch all who wish it, and to
require no membership within its boundaries, because these boundaries are in flux, moving,
shifting, over different bodies in different contexts.
Opening the Category of Women
Post-structuralist thought has been utilized by many feminist theorists to advocate that
“feminist efforts must be directed toward dismantling this fiction (of ‘woman’),” (Alcoff 1988, p.
417). While identifying with patriarchal conceptions of ‘women’ is theorized by Brown and
Riley to resubordinate women, the history of the present must be considered in order to
understand the parameters of a launch point of women’s future in the world. Ridding the
category of ‘women’ of it’s patriarchal configurements would have to fundamentally challenge
the naturalized understandings of who women are, as they have almost always been defined in
relation to men. If the conception of ‘women’ is so often resignified, it seems both important and
perilous to invoke Julia Kristeva’s analysis of the modern European feminism invocation of
‘women’, which “is itself a temporary form which must wither away,” (Riley 2003, p. 109).
What is specifically important about Kristeva’s analysis is the temporality o f of any claim to
woman, where resignification of gender identity must constantly be propelling towards the future
imagined, the future desired, rather than configured in relation and limited to oppressive
structures of the past and the present. To allow ‘women’ to be free from essentialist definitions is
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“to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been
authorized,” (Butler 1992, p. 15).
Natalie Stoljar invokes nominalism to construct a cluster concept of ‘women’: “‘Woman’
could be the name of a class of similar particulars without implying that womanness constitutes a
natural universal,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 276). If we accept that ‘women’ are socially constructed,
“then the 'essence* of woman... is a nominal one. It is a totality of qualities, properties and
attributes that such feminists define, envisage, or enact for themselves,” (de Lauretis 2003, p. 3).
Stoljar smartly nominates woman as a “cluster-concept,” organizing individuals based on real
similarities among the real and social type of ‘woman.’ She outlines for general elements of the
cluster-concept of ‘women’:
The first element she discusses is womanness as “attributed on the basis of female sex,”
such as chromosomal makeup or “bodily characteristics such as gait or voice quality.” Secondly,
the phenomenological features of being a woman which includes both experiences produced both
by social factors, “like fear of walking on the streets at night or fear of rape,” and physical
factors, like menstrual pain or feminine sexuality. Her third element describes the culturally
produced and embodied roles that women experience, ranging from the responsibilities women
are saddled with (like child-rearing or making oneself small), to women’s oppression under
normative expressions of femininity (how women are propositioned to dress, act, and move.) Her
fourth element is both self-identification and how we are perceived by others; “calling oneself a
woman and being called a woman,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 283-284).
What “counts” as being a woman is controversial, but if we understand these elements as
not wholly constitutive of every woman, but rather as markers of similarity among women, the
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exclusionary nature of a homogenized form that women can take is avoided. Her first element
includes female sex which might automatically be read as trans-exclusionary, but she explains
that “female sex is centrally important to the notion of woman and how individuals can be
women without being of the female sex,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 285). Within her projection of
‘women’ as a resemblance class, “people are women when they have enough of the properties
relevant in the application of the concept,” (Stoljar 1995, p. 288). While this idea is freshly
tangible in its discussion of what a pragmatic feminist politics could look like for women, would
being an individual who satisfies all four elements make them more of a woman than someone
who identifies with only one or two elements? Emphasizing that there is a degree to which one is
a woman is not a problematic concept in itself, because there are various degrees to which we all
embody our personal identities (for example, someone who is white-passing but identifies as a
person of color due to their lineage and experiences.) It should follow that satisfying all four
elements within the cluster-group of ‘women’ does not necessarily mean the maximization of
patriarchal oppression, because their are privileges attached to embodying perfectly the
conception of the idealized ‘woman’ (being cisgender, with reproductive capacities, and visually
discernible as a woman). It should also follow that any qualifying elements within the cluster of
women’s identification are always shifting and open to re-signification, to adding elements,
subtracting them, a politics of contestation.
Though there is no single, unifying, socio-physical experience of gender, or of race, or of
class, there is a web of material and nonmaterial conditions, woven through a plurality of hands
and experiences. By ‘material conditions’ I do not mean internal or essential conditions that
make someone a woman, but rather the materiality that configures and imposes itself upon this
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subject disposition. A web of woman can be imagined as the material, emotional, and social
obstacles and hindrances being the strings of “woman” that immobilize individuals, all captured
within their infinite specificity of locatedness. The materiality of tucking underwear for some
trans women, the materiality of chest binders for some trans men who have possibility had past
experience as a woman, the materiality of menstruation, of menopause, of never getting a period,
but the physical pain of wanting one so that you can be like other girls, the emotional discourse
that imbeds all women deeply in both shame and pleasure of the material and emotional life of
gender.
The normative foundations of identity categories are constantly being resignified in
accordance to always-shifting relevant sociocultural norms, and thus attention to the specificity
of factionalizations has been, and could be, a truly emancipatory task of feminist discourse and
theorizing. Contestations of circulating definitions of ‘women’ don’t have to be conflict-oriented
factionalizations, but could be a way to deconstruct terms of identity and unwed them from an
assumed experience, to “continue to use (these terms), to repeat them, to repeat them
subversively, and to displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as
instruments of oppressive power,” (Brown 1992, p. 17). To continue to use these terms in new,
generative ways, to include emotions as markers for how people are subjected, to use how people
interact with space and location, to define ‘who’ women are by ‘what we want,’ which is always
shaped by what we have, and the conditions in the present (Brown 1995, p. 75).
A politics of feminism does not need to abandon the subject of women, but a politics of
feminism cannot be grounded in women, and the women that feminist politics speak for cannot
be taken for granted as essential, inherent, or fixed. If gender categories are theorized to be
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essential or beyond negation, these concepts it will be challenged. The concept of ‘woman’ will
continue to evolve, reorganize, and deconstruct itself, as will all human-defined categorizations.
Constantly resignifying “women” as a normative identity will also lead to a continuous
evaluation of how women interact with the world, and the world interacts with women, or one’s
womanness. I too believe that “the rifts among women over the content of the term ought to be
safeguarded and prized, indeed, that this constant rifting ought to be affirmed as the ungrounded
ground of feminist theory,” (Butler 1992, 16). However, this “constant rifting” of the term
‘woman’ should not be the only ground from which feminist theory bases its politics, though it
should be a ground. Moving to decentralize the subject of ‘women’ as feminism’s primary
subject is a step towards expanding it’s analysis to subjects not located within the gender binary,
and also a step towards a feminist politics that is capable of recognizing the intersections of
privilege and powerlessness within identities.
Decentralizing the Subject of ‘Women’ as the Primary Subject of Feminism
A feminist politics that demonizes men as the enemy and patriarchy as the sole source of
women’s oppression relies on a “reductive dichotomy between men and women” that refuses
intersectionality in it’s insistence on investing in a political consciousness which “has been built
around simple dichotomies such as powerful/powerless; oppressor/victim,” (Cohen 1997, p. 452,
480). For example, “Kill All Men,” is a presumably feminist slogan, which spread from the art
world to the internet, one denoting the fantasy of a violent overthrow of patriarchy. The slogan
emphasises gender as the target and source of oppression, but fails to acknowledge that the
speaker of a slogan must rely on a dichotomy of power which precludes any intersectional
understanding of identities. Popular twitter account “@gringatears” who runs the podcast “Bitter
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Brown Femmes” stated in one tweet: “I’m not okay with White feminists and their ‘kill all men’
flower Tumblr gifs aesthetic. Your whiteness has/does kill men. Non-White men.” This tweet
emblemized how white women feel incapable of being an oppressor simply because of their
oppressed status within patriarchy. “White feminism” has become colloquially acknowledged to
express when a theory or person fails to address the intersections of racial identity and
experience. A feminism that demonizes all men “discounts the relationships- especially those
based on shared experiences of marginalization-” that exist between men and women,
“particularly in communities of color,” (Cohen 1997, p. 450).
Feminism should not be delimited to women as its subject, because women’s liberation is
intrinsically tied to issues that encompass more than just women. Liberation from systemic or
supremasist racism will encur the liberation of women, and others who are immobilized by racial
discrimination. Liberation from the straight state, the heteronormativity that constricts sexual
identities, another occurence of women’s liberation. Class oppression and the emotional,
material, immobilizing harms of capitalism, this is about women. Deconstructing and fighting
what the gender binary tells us to be, who patriarchy tells us women are, this is a fight for
anyone cognizant enough to recognize that these systems of power all benefit from and
reproduce eachother. A
 s subjects shift, politics shift as well, and our theorizing needs to keep
up. Resistance to patriarchal oppression will be best enacted when actual connective tissues of
subordinated femininity are elucidated, and when these tissues can be understood as always in
movement, touching bodies perceived as women, touching bodies that are seen as less than
human, touching bodies that are subordinated in historical power dynamics. It is when “feminism
is no longer directed towards a critique of patriarchy, or secured by the categories of ‘women’ or
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‘gender’, that is it is doing the most ‘moving’ work,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 176). By ‘moving’,
Ahmed is talking about the loss of an object, the loss restriction to only one subject, that could
enable feminism’s energy to “open up possibilities of action that are not constrained by what we
are against in the present,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 176). Losing the subject of women as a ‘ground’ for
feminism “opens up possibilities of action that are not constrained by” how we are defined in the
present. With the loss of a fixed and assumed subject of ‘women,’ possibilities of feminist
politics bubble over into resisting the subordination of the Earth, advocating for creatures
organized in a hierarchy of value as less valuable than humans, and supporting marginalized
sexualities deemed irregular and inconsistent within a heteronormative gender binary. Feminism
should resist and speak out against the subordination of oppressed subjects by contesting the very
terms of such oppression. Feminism should be contesting that there are physical and emotional
traits that make someone’s life less valuable than someone else's.
If there is no universal solution, or no universal problem, there is no universal subject, no
universal theory. Feminism should proceed with acknowledging the reality of a political system
built on categorizations, but feminism should profess a world-system of contingent,
deconstructed realities of fluidity and criticism. Feminism can avoid determining a universal
conception of who ‘women’ are by relinquishing the ability to define women by one thing, one
experience, or one interpretation. There should always be a voice saying “No, that’s not it,” thus,
I agree in part with Julia Kristeva, because the process by which we define ‘woman’ must be
constantly negated, and "a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already
exists so that we may say 'that's not it' and 'that's still not it,” (Kristeva 1981, p. 137). An
embodied and stable notion of who and what women are is not necessary in order to have a

37

Gwen Frost

feminist praxis that invokes more than a discourse of constant negation (“that’s not it”). To
deconstruct the subject is to free oneself from the connotations and prejudices one’s subjecthood
carries, and to de-essentialize but keep in understanding the historical transfigurations that mark
all of our bodies.
Poststructural thinkers like Julia Kristeva promote a feminist politics that refuses to
articulate the subject of ‘woman’ as a category worth claiming for feminist politics. "A woman
cannot be; it is something which does not even belong in the order of being. It follows that a
feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already exists….” (Kristeva 1981, p.
137). Within much of post-structural feminism, women cannot be liberated from patriarchal
domination unless they subvert all association and identification as women. The difficulty in
finding the language to describe and discuss poststructural feminism is actually indicative of a
strength of poststructural-feminism. Is our inability to write about women beyond their historical
construction a promising subversion of women’s subordination? Or would we be losing the
words from our mouths about discrimination we know to be true to our feminine bodies or
feminized subjectivities? Our discourse is limited from imagining possibilities for ourselves
outside of the constructions of our own subjectivity. Our words, our stories of the world, and the
propagations of stereotypes, these all inform our ability to understand ourselves, and each other.
If “woman” could be so thoroughly disrupted by infinite and distinct embodiments and
expressions, then would gender discrimination be revealed as only a coincidental, would gender
discrimination continue to be talked about at all? How would we talk about it?
Feminist Consciousness: A Turn to Movements Over Identity
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The contestation of the category of ‘women’ is an absolutely necessary discussion for
feminist politics. In discussing what could serve to ground feminist politics, we should turn not
towards grounding our politics in a definitive subject, but rather in a stratified resistance to all
forms of subordination. If any and all universal traits of women are problematically racialized,
classist, and heteronormative, is there a salvageable category of ‘women’ to carry with us into
future theorizing if we are also fighting for stripping feminism of it’s white supremacy,
heteronormativity, and feminism’s negligence of how women’s experiences vary across
socioeconomic position and cultural location? It seems that “in many contexts, 'women' are too
heterogeneous to be treated as a unitary group,” (Hunter 1996, p. 156). The task of mitigating our
discourse to avoid totalizing any theory is a positive trajectory for intersectional feminism.
Perhaps there should be no ‘feminism,’ only feminisms, a network of alliances to alleviate
subordination that occurs through various apparatuses on our gendered and sexed beings.
I argue that investing in a feminist consciousness is different than investing in a
consciousness of women, and retaining an investment in consciousness based around shared
ideals and grievances is a better investment for feminist politics than a women’s consciousness,
which only goes as far to assert commonality around identity. A feminist consciousness would
offer a practice of understanding the tethered fates of all oppressed peoples, and the tethered pain
of oppressed peoples, which through speaking of our pain and listening to others pain can be a
“condition for the formation of a ‘we’, made up of different stories of pain that cannot be
reduced to a ground, identity, or a sameness,” (Ahmed 2015, p. 174).
What would a politics not invested in a fixed subject look like? In “Punks, Bulldaggers,
and Welfare Queens,” Cathy J. Cohen asks us to consider “a politics where one’s relation to
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power, and not some homogenized identity, is privileged in determining one’s political
comrades,” (Cohen 1997, p. 438). The potential for transformative coalition work is inhibited by
“political practices structured around binary conceptions of sexuality and power,” or binary
conceptions of gender and power, as we’ve seen in my example of white feminism, where all
women are imagined to be oppressed, and all men are imagined to be oppressive, discounting
and disregarding the varying levels of privilege that are experienced by members of both groups
due to racial identity, class-status, and sexual orientation (Cohen 1997, p. 441). Cohen elucidates
that a problem with queer politics is that the reproduction of a dichotomy of power
(heterosexuals/all queers) reduces and “collapses our understanding of power into a single
continuum of evaluation,” (Cohen 1997, p. 452). The dichotomous approaches to power that
“consistently activate only one characteristic of their identity… to organize their politics”
actually reject “any recognition of the multiple and intersecting systems of power that largely
dictate our life chances,” (Cohen 1997, p. 440). Cohen argues that black and latinx women
welfare recipients face systemic oppression due to the always racialized, gendered, and
capitalistic institution of heteronormativity. Cohen makes this argument not to argue that the
experiences of varying queer peoples should be conflated or assumed synonymous to other
groups that suffer due to heterosexual domination, but rather to profess a queer politics that is
“inclusive of all those who stand outside of the dominant constructured norm of state-sanctioned
white middle- and upper-class heterosexuality,” (Cohen 1997, p. 441). By acknowledging the
contingent oppressions of welfare recipients and queer people, political coalitions can be formed
by grappling with heteronormativy’s expansive power, a power that is inextricably embedded
and reproduced in white supremacy, patriarchy, and class-based oppression. Though the same
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oppressive power structure may be elucidated as a common enemy, it is important to emphasize
that these oppressions are experienced in different ways, and have different effects, on differing
subjects. It is not a professed ‘sameness’ of experience that grounds coalitional politics, but
rather a deep understanding of how the intersectionality of identity can link movements of
marginalized peoples. I argue for a feminist solidarity like Cohens, that moves across and among
identities, grounded in “our shared marginal relationship to dominant power which normalizes,
legitimizes, and privileges,” (Cohen 1997, p. 458). This connective tissue requires an
intersectional analysis of how power functions on different bodies and in different regions,
creating a politics that acknowledges the tethered fates of people across and within identities.
This also requires acknowledging the privileges marginalized people hold within marginalized
communities; for example, a queer person with white privilege experiences the violence of
heteronormativity differently than a queer latinx person, and attention to these differences
requires not only a comprehensive analysis of the different ways heteronormativity functions, but
also grappling with how white normativity organizes and oppresses different bodies in
conjunction with, and isolation from, the heteronormative power that marks both bodies.
The connectivity between persons on the basis of what is deprived does not necessarily
need a subject, but it requires people who share this need, and people who profess solidarity and
support despite their differences in identity or experience. Feminism must lose the category of
women as it’s only subject, as a subject defined in a fixed manner, and the characteristics of
women must be constantly defined, and redefined, for as long as subjectivity is constantly being
redefined by the peoples under it’s guise, we, as feminists, can perpetuate and assert a culture of
offering our best possible truths, and never rendering them complete or entirely holistic.
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Feminist politics doesn’t require a negative politics despite my arguments that the
category of ‘women’ should always be contested ; reactivity alone does not need to guide or
restrict the possibilities for how oppressed peoples resist or articulate better futures. In some
ways, all of humanity that lives today is confined in some way confined or burdened by
ideologies which rely upon the subordination of characteristics that we would all serve to
reconsider; animalism, weakness, vulnerability, lack of desire to master the earth, etc. A world
where ‘woman’ no longer means being subordinated can be imagined by not just naive iterations
that don’t reflect reality, but think beyond the names we have been born into. If we proctor
understanding the role of our own identities in our own experience, this knowledge cannot avoid
inseminating the ideals we hold about others. The revolution will be self-reflective. We may very
well begin to understand the practice of being, and articulate for ourselves a future that is not
constricted to how we are perceived and located within categories of identification. People who
identify as ‘women’ can resist subordination by critically engaging the alliances and
commonalities shared by those subordinated. To comprehend a theory of universalize
domination, to varying degrees and extents and experiences. Feminism would be suited to
comprehend a theory of universalize domination, to varying degrees and extents and experiences,
in order to examine the connective fibers that makes feminism necessary for the world.
One example of a generative, unexplored “connective tissue” in feminist politics (neither
theory nor praxis) is between Donald Trump’s rhetoric of “Energy Dominance,” used in both
legislation and as an expressed position of the U.S. “Energy Dominant” is the stance of the U.S.
in terms of ceasing to drill or frack oil; the U.S. is not cutting back, repurposing, or
reconceptualizing energy, Trump says; the U.S. is energy dominant. Trump is deploying a
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masculinist conception of subordination onto a submissive “other.” This “submissiveness” is
gained through subordination, force, or an unwillingness to negotiate. People who engage in the
embodied resistance of Trump’s violent immigration policies and rhetoric are also positioned
against his legislation of masculinist conceptions of a forcefully subordinated “other.” Could
resistance to these violences ever solely be attributed to powers of patriarchy, or of white
supremacy, or of heterosexism, of class-based oppression? Is this resistance solely the task of
women, of people of color, of queer people, or of the lower socioeconomic class? I argue this
resistance between two stratas of embodied identity is a connective tissue. Feminist theory taking
up more coalitional politics is a feminism attentive to connective tissues. The analysis of patterns
in how different identities and different bodies are marked with and by emotions is a fruitful
connective tissue, one to be explored across geographic and social locations. To explore the
connective tissue of emotions within culturally assigned identities could produce articulations of
tethered struggles, movements, and passions. Feminist practice gaining momentum in taking up
connective tissues means the being moved and motivated by stories where you are not the
subject.

Conclusion
Feminist politics is having an identity crisis, and so am I. Gender fluidity is not the first
cultural phenomenon to bring up a cacophony of criticisms about mainstream feminism’s limited
scope, subject, and content. By examining how canonical feminist thinkers have attempted to
ground feminist politics in a defined category of women, I have sought to show how feminism
has problematically promoted gender essentialism in a way that constricts the politics of
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feminism by recreating the discourse of women as naturally or essentially subordinated by male
domination. Limiting feminism’s project to only be attentive to the connective tissue between
women doesn’t go far enough to unpack how this tissue connects people outside of the category
of ‘women.’ When feminism fails to have an intersectional analysis of power and subjectivity, it
also fails to have any relevant truths to offer the question of how power functions outside of the
dichotomy of power where ‘men’ are the oppressors, and ‘women’ are the oppressed. This kind
of analysis could only occur in a vacuum.
Gender fluidity is not a problem for feminism, but rather an opportunity for feminism, to
establish connective tissues of experience, emotion, and political ideals in order to mobilize
solidarity, instead of relying on a fixed category of identification to denote its politics.
Decentralizing the subject of ‘women’ is important for feminism not just in wake of gender
fluidities rising popularity, but also in recognizing that a politics that is only attentive to the
gendered being of ‘woman’ cannot account for the complex interrelations of patriarchy, white
supremacy, class-based oppression, and other institutional powers of domination. Awareness of
our tethered oppressions is the first step of building a collective consciousness that can no longer
see any system of domination as intrinsically separate from any other system of domination.
Feminist politics should adopt a deconstructive approach when engaging with identity
categories. A deconstructive approach prompts feminism to make structural accounts of how
various subjects are produced by power dynamics that seek to essentialize stereotyped
conceptions of oppressed peoples. A deconstructive approach does not require a rejection and
demonization of all characteristics culturally associated with women, but it does reject that any
of these characteristics are innate or essential. Just as there is no one universal attribute of
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women, there is no one source of women’s oppression. A deconstructive approach requires the
understanding that we are all constructed and imbricated differently within power relations, but
that these differences do not necessarily correlate to also having different or incompatible
political desires. In fact, these differences are a strength of coalitional politics, enabling a richer
understanding of how emotions circulate and come to mark some bodies and not others, of how
prejudices that rely on similar justifications come to restrict some bodies, and not others.
The subject of ‘women’ is a category we have inherited, but it will only be a
condemnation of our futures if we let it define us in all that we are. I’m not offering a politics of
identity, but a politics of emotion, like Sara Ahmed, and a politics of deconstruction, like Judith
Butler, a politics of temporality, like Denise Riley, a politics that moves, is felt, that touches us.
A chorus of joy, pain, restriction, freedom, and attention to the tethered fates of oppressed
peoples everywhere. Restricting the primary subject of feminism to ‘women’ limits feminist
politics from the potential power it could have on the lives of subordinated peoples everywhere.
If something is a ‘feminist issue,’ it should not be aligned with feminist politics simply because a
woman is touched by it; it should be aligned with feminist politics if it is not a world that
feminism wants to invest in, to recreate, or to endorse. If connective tissues can be established,
integration of individuals into groups should congeal into overlapping and indiscriminate
groupings that revolve around changing desires, interests, and urgencies, developing constant
iterations of better worlds, better arguments, better theories.
My theory of ‘connective tissues’ of emotion as a ground for feminist politics promotes a
politics of analyzing patterns that arise in comparing how different bodies and identities are
subordinated, and attending to the complexities of power structures. A feminist consciousness
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that is attentive to the emotional currents sustaining patriarchal domination is likely to find that
these emotional currents travel through a variety of systems of domination. In my example of
Abu Ghraib, I discussed how the sexualization of inequality and of power dynamics is not
limited to female bodies or women subjects, but permeates across the bodies of prisoners, queer
people, and non-white persons who live in white-dominated societies. It is important for feminist
politics to be attentive to how sexual subordination is weaponized and deployed in pre-existing
power dynamics, like racial hierarchies, in order to truly resist the concept that sexual
subordination is a natural affect of the human condition. To contest the terms of such power
dynamics is also a vital project for feminism, to resist the universal but varied oppression of
subordinated persons. Attending to how various subject groups experience oppression (such as
sexual subordination) that feminism has historically designated as ‘women’s issues’ allows these
issues to be not descriptive or indicative of one’s position as a woman, but rather indicative of
one’s relationship to the dominant power structures of the world. Opening the subject of
feminism is the process of building a coalitional feminist politics, a politics that is capable of
attending to a multiplicity of subjects that share investments in the destruction of oppressive
power structures. Patriarchy is not a system that only touches the bodies of women- it is also a
structure that is deeply invested in heteronormativity for the purposes of controlling the
reproduction of subjects and the organization of families. Political rhetoric around ‘reproduction’
being the primary role of female bodied people is also deployed in anti-gay rhetoric that requires
‘reproduction’ be a signifier of legitimate sexual relationships. The United States government
has sought to control the reproductive capabilities and practices of Black women in the U.S,
forcefully promoting eugenics in order to maintain white dominance and white purity in the
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national population. ‘Reproduction’ is a connective tissue woven through a plurality of identities
of oppressed peoples who are affected by norms around reproduction that aim to promote
‘acceptable’ forms of child-rearing based on who is considered to be an ‘unacceptable’ parent.
This is a way that feminist politics can take up the politics of reproduction as a connective tissue
that imbricates a multiplicity of people, while refraining to isolate, homegeonize, and hierarchize
the perspective of ‘women as a whole’ as the subject of the discussion.
‘Reproduction’ is just one example of how feminist politics can maintain attention to the
material conditions that pervade the lives of many women, without promoting the the notion
systems invested in controlling women’s reproduction affect only women, and that the women it
does affect are all effected in a homogenous way. Feminist politics have relied on being able to
locate some issues as specific to ‘women,’ and also to locate those ‘women’ as sharing a set of
identifiable traits. In an age where gender is becoming more fluid, feminist politics need to adapt
with it. Feminism must relinquish the over-simplified notion of a dichotomous system of power,
a system that is also invested in maintaining the gender binary as a means of organizing and
controlling gendered subjects. Feminism must also relinquish the subject of women as its
exclusive subject of exploration, and turn instead to a politics of inter-related subjects and
connected experiences of oppression. Opening the category of women to resignification,
decentralizing ‘women’ from being the primary and assumed subject of feminism, and turning to
movements of collective politics, connected tissue, and analyses of emotion will ultimately
reorient contemporary feminist politics to a more inclusive, intersectional, and relevant form of
politics. Defining ‘women’ has been a political project of feminism since feminism’s origination
as a movement, and the tradition should continue with a deconstructive aim. The connective
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tissue of feminist politics no longer has to be the subject of women; rather, it can be an
amalgamation of contingent oppressions, the affective politics of emotion, the building of
solidarity across stratas of identity. To mobilize feminist politics we must permit feminism to
move, to draw patterns of social experience in an unlimited manner, resulting in a clearer focus
of how complex and far-reaching oppressive structures of power truly are.
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